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Abstract
Firms oﬀer highly complex contracts to their employees. These contracts contain a mix
of various incentives, such as ﬁxed wages, bonuses, promise of promotion, and threat of
ﬁring. This paper aims at explaining the reason why this incentive-mix arises. In particular,
the model focuses on why ﬁr m sa r ec o m b i n i n gp r o m o t i o n sa n db o n u s e sw i t hﬁring. The
theoretical model proposed is a job-assignment model with heterogeneous employees. In
this model the ﬁrm is concerned about job assignment, because the overall productivity
of the ﬁrm depends upon the quality of the employees and their allocation to jobs. The
model shows that ﬁring has a dual role. Firing creates incentives for the employees, and
it is used as a sorting device that allows the ﬁrm to improve workforce quality. Thus,
quality-concerned ﬁrms might want to combine cost-eﬃcient incentives such as promotions
and bonuses with ﬁring. To comply with the Gibbons and Waldman critique, a large set of
the model’s broader predictions is stated explicitly and tested on the personnel records from
a large pharmaceutical company. The model’s predictions are shown to be consistent with
the data.
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11 Motivation
Firms use a variety of economic incentives to motivate their employees. Fixed wages, bonuses,
promise of promotion, and threat of ﬁring are the most frequently used ones. In general, econo-
mists understand why ﬁrms choose to use various incentives, but not why ﬁrms would prefer a
speciﬁc mix. Understanding the reasons why such a mix arises has strong policy implications,
besides contributing to our understanding of personnel economics. The reason is that in many
markets ﬁring, an important piece of the incentive mix, is constrained. Thus, understanding the
e c o n o m i cr o l eo ft h ei n c e n t i v em i x ,a n di np a r t i c u l a rt h er o l eo fﬁring, provides yet another angle
to evaluate the eﬀects of labor-market regulations. This paper presents a theoretical model of
how incentives are used in ﬁrms, and provides empirical evidence showing that ﬁrms that are con-
cerned about the quality of the workforce, may have strong interests in using ﬁring. Consequently,
quality-concerned ﬁrms in heavily regulated markets might face comparative disadvantage when
competing internationally, because they are forced to undertake second-best personnel policies.
Traditionally, it has been diﬃcult to obtain detailed information on the compensation systems
used in ﬁrms. Nevertheless, the evidence that ﬁrms use a rich set of incentives is accumulating
see Medoﬀ and Abraham [1980, 1981]; Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström [1994a,b]; Gibbs [1995];
and Lazear [1992, 2000]. To conduct the present analysis of within ﬁrm incentives we have
successfully obtained the personnel records from a large pharmaceutical ﬁrm, in which the four
incentives: ﬁxed wages, bonuses, promise of promotion, and threat of ﬁring are observed. This
detailed information, and in particular the observed role of ﬁring, makes these data well-suited
to investigate the incentive-mix in a joint theoretical-empirical framework.
Conventional economic theory motivates the use of the diﬀerent incentive mechanisms in
separate frameworks. First, the performance-pay literature, which originates from Mirrlees [1974,
1976] and Holmström [1979, 1982], explains why pay should be linked to output. According to
this theory, wages should include variable elements, such as bonuses or piece rate, to reward
employee eﬀort. Second, the eﬃciency-wage literature started oﬀ by Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984]
emphasizes the incentive-eﬀect of ﬁring, or the threat of ﬁring. Intuitively, if employment involves
rents, then the fear of losing the job provides incentives.
Tournament theory, initiated by Lazear and Rosen [1981], integrates the usage of the in-
centives in a competitive framework. If the number of workers rewarded, ﬁred, or promoted is
preset, then workers have an incentive to exert eﬀort. In principle, tournament theory explains
why ﬁrms would use any element of the mix. Tournament theory cannot explain, however, why
the ﬁrm would prefer a speciﬁc mix of incentives.
MacLeod and Malcolmson [1998] analyze the relative merits of diﬀerent incentive tools. They
contrast eﬃciency-wage and performance-pay incentives, that is, ﬁring and bonus payments as
incentive tools. Under the eﬃciency wage system, ﬁrms pay rents ex-ante, and provide incentives
by ﬁring shirking workers. Under the performance-pay regime, ﬁr m sp a yb o n u s e se x - p o s t ,c o n d i -
tional on eﬀort. The model shows that, in general, eﬃciency-wage incentives are more expensive.
Yet, eﬃciency wage might arise because it gives compensation upfront. Hence, if the ﬁrm cannot
commit to pay bonuses, then eﬃciency wages might be the only way to motivate employees. The
results, however, do not answer the question why the observed incentive mix can arise. In the
MacLeod and Malcolmson [1998] setup, either eﬃciency wage or performance pay prevails.
Our basic model, which is a traditional principal-agent model with hidden eﬀort, is set in
2a two period setup. The ﬁrst period is in the focus of our investigation, when the ﬁrm oﬀers
employment contract in terms of ﬁxed wages, bonuses and ﬁring and promotion probabilities.
It is shown that the optimal behavior of the ﬁrm is to motivate the employees through bonus
payments and promotions, but it should not ﬁre employees. Thus, the incentive mix observed in
ﬁrms does not arise. The reason is that in contrast to promotions and bonus payments, ﬁring is
wasteful. Firing is costly both for the ﬁrm (recruiting and training of new employees) and for the
worker (job search), and in equilibrium the ﬁrm shoulders all these costs. Thus, the ﬁrm prefers
to oﬀer promotions and bonuses over threatening employees with layoﬀs.
The basic model is extended to accommodate employee-heterogeneity. The proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrm is now concerned about job assignment, because the overall productivity of the ﬁrm in the
second period depends upon the quality of the employees and their allocation to jobs. These
concerns create a trade-oﬀ for the ﬁrm. Increasing ﬁring induces additional costs on the ﬁrm.
Firing, however, also increases second period employee quality. This trade-oﬀ explains why the
ﬁrm might prefer to use the delicate mix of incentives, which is observed in the data.
The paper shows that the incentive-mix, and, in particular, ﬁring, has profound implications
for the within-ﬁrm dynamics. These implications are explored to characterize employees’ careers.
In particular, it is shown that within organizational rank, selection on tenure is not necessarily
negative as argued in earlier research by Medoﬀ and Abraham [1980, 1981], Lazear [1992, 2000],
Gibbs [1995], and Gibbons and Waldman [1999a,b]. The empirical analysis conﬁrms this theo-
retical result by providing the ﬁrst example for positive within organizational rank selection on
tenure. This ﬁnding shows, as Guasch and Weiss [1980] suggest, that selection constitutes an
interesting alternative to on-the-job human-capital acquisition to explain the eﬀects of tenure on
earnings. In fact, selection alone can justify a positively sloped earning proﬁle in tenure.
The model’s additional predictions about the employee’s careers are tested formally in the
empirical section of the paper. Contrasting the broad set of predictions to data is used to comply
with the Gibbons and Waldman [1999a,b] critique, namely that many models may be able to
explain a single empirical ﬁnding (such as the observed incentive mix), but they often fail to
explain a broader pattern of empirical evidence. First, it is conﬁrmed that the ﬁrm engages in
sorting based on performance which is a basic assumption of the job assignment model. Second,
it is established that the ﬁrm has a positive selection, i.e., individuals with higher rank and higher
tenure are more likely to be of high-ability. Also, the model’s predictions about the likelihood of
receiving bonus payments, being promoted and being laid oﬀ, are shown to be consistent with
the data.
In the next section, the basic model is outlined. Section 3 extends this model to accommodate
employee heterogeneity and address the consequences of sorting and selection for the employees’
career evolution. Furthermore, the predictions of the theoretical model are stated here. The
data are presented in section 4, and the close relation between the empirical contract and the
theoretical model is emphasized. In section 5, the model’s predictions are tested empirically. A
detailed discussion of the model’s limitations and suggestions for future research takes place in
section 6. Finally, section 7 summarizes and concludes.
32B a s i c m o d e l
The basic model entails the contracting relationship between a risk-neutral ﬁrm and a continuum
of risk-neutral employees in a two period game. The ﬁrm and the employees form a principal-
agent relationship. The ﬁrm maximizes expected proﬁt, while the employees maximize their
expected utility.
The game is divided in two periods. The ﬁrst period is the more interesting for our purposes,
where the ﬁrm oﬀers an employment contract in terms of ﬁxed wage, bonus, ﬁring and promotion.
The timing of events in the ﬁrst period is as follows:
1. The ﬁrm oﬀers a contract to prospective employees. If they accept it, they are hired.
2. Employees decide about the eﬀort level.
3. Output is realized and observed by all.
4. Bonuses are paid; employees are promoted or ﬁred.
In the second period the ﬁrm has two actions. First, it has to ﬁll management vacancies
which can be done either by promotions or external hiring. Second, employees leaving the non-
management level due to layoﬀs or promotions have to be replaced. Furthermore, retained and
newly hired employees produce output without an explicit incentive problem.1
The employees produce binary output in the ﬁrst period, which is normalized to 0 (low) or
C (high), where C>0. The probability that the output is C, is θ and naturally θ ∈ (0,1).T h e
employee, once having accepted the job, can inﬂuence the probability of high output by exerting
eﬀort. The utility cost of eﬀort exertion is e, and eﬀort increases the probability of success by
δ>0. The table below summarizes the probabilities:
without eﬀort with eﬀort
low output (0) 1 − θ 1 − θ − δ
high output (C) θθ + δ
The eﬀort is worth undertaking, i.e. the private costs of eﬀort are strictly less than the production
gains, formally: e<δ C. We further assume that θ + δ<1.
The utility of the employee’s alternative job option is denoted by ¯ U>0. Furthermore, the
additional utility of a promotion is UP > 0, and the utility cost from being ﬁred is UF > 0.T h e
utility of promotion stems from managerial rents, and is discussed in detail in the appendix. The
utility loss from ﬁring reﬂects that if an employee is laid oﬀ, then he or she must search for a
new job, which is costly, as there are frictions on the labor market.
The ﬁrm sets the ﬁrst period employment contract through the following four parameters:
{w,b,πP,πF}.F i r s t , a ﬁxed wage (w) is oﬀered to all individuals who accept the job irrespec-
tive of performance. The remaining three parameters are conditioned on performance. It is
assumed that bonus payments (b) are paid to well-performing agents, that the ﬁrm considers
promoting employees with high observable output (high performance), and considers ﬁring em-
ployees with low observed output (low performance). The conditional promotion probability and
1Thus, the second period can be interpreted as the long run consequence of ﬁrst period job assigment decisions.
Incentive problems are abstracted away to help focus on the ﬁrst period problem.
4the conditional ﬁring probability are denoted by πP and πF, respectively. The parameters are
(realistically) constrained as follows: w,b ≥ 0; πF,πP ∈ [0,1].2
Turnover is costly, as the ﬁrm has replacement and training costs. These costs are summarized
in the turnover-cost parameter K>0. This implies that costs are imposed on the ﬁrm when it
ﬁlls management vacancies but also when it decides to layoﬀ employees. The equilibrium volume
of ﬁrm-initiated separations is (1 − θ − δ)πF in equilibrium.3
The employees desire promotion to management, because promotion entails rent. The number
of employees who can be promoted is, however, constrained by the number of vacant positions at
the management level. That is, the volume of promotions (θ+δ)πP is constrained by the volume
of exogenous job openings at the managerial level, which is normalized to 1/H. Parameter H
can be interpreted as a hierarchy size diﬀerence between employee and managerial rank. The
above argumentation is summarized in the promotion-constraint (P):




It is assumed that (θ + δ) <H , which implies that not all well-performing employees can be
promoted.4
In the second period, the ﬁrm has two hierarchical ranks: employees and managers.5 Em-
ployees uniformly produce output F. Furthermore, employee compensation in the second period
is normalized to zero.
{0,C} output realizations
M managerial output
F output in the second period
θ probability that output is high
δ probability increase with eﬀort
e eﬀort cost
¯ U utility of alternative job option
UP utility of a promotion
UF utility cost from being ﬁred
H size-ratio of managerial and employee rank
w ﬁxed wage
b bonus paid conditional on high output
πP probability of promotion conditional on high output
πF probability of ﬁring conditional on low output
Table 1: Model parameters
Managers consist of formerly promoted non-management employees and individuals hired
from the external labor market directly into management. Managerial incentives and participa-
2Conditioning bonus, promotion and ﬁring on output as above can be done without the loss of generality,
which can be seen from the discussion in the appendix.
3In equilibrium the ﬁrm will elicit high eﬀort.
4The assumption is realistic and used only to ease the exposition. It does not change the results.
5The two layer hierarchy provides the simplest setting to analyze the employee incentive mix without analyzing
complicated multi-layer hierarchies. Furthermore, only 5% of the observations in our data considers managers,
thus theoretical ﬁndings on management rank would be hard to verify empirically.
5tion are not modeled explicitly and assumed to contribute to the ﬁrm’s proﬁtw i t haﬁxed-value
M. We assume that F<M , i.e. managerial output is more important than employee output
in the second period. This follows from the fact that managers aﬀect the output of multiple
non-management employees. Managers pay is also normalized to zero.6
In order to keep the analysis tractable, it is assumed that the ﬁrm has all the bargaining
power. Furthermore, two tie-breaking rules are imposed. First, indiﬀerent players act such that
the other player is better oﬀ. Second, employees are assumed to prefer less risky payments with
t h es a m em e a n . 7 Finally, the observed incentive mix is deﬁned as the equilibrium in which the
ﬁrm strictly prefers to set all the parameters {w,b,πP,πF} to non-zero values.
2.1 Contracting problem
The contracting problem is summarized in the following equations:
max
w,b,πF,πP





(IC) w − e +( θ + δ)[b + πPUP] − (1 − θ − δ)πFUF ≥ w + θ[b + πPUP] − (1 − θ)πFUF
(IR) w − e +( θ + δ)[b + πPUP] − (1 − θ − δ)πFUF ≥ ¯ U
(P)( θ + δ)πP ≤
1
H
non-negativity w,b ≥ 0
probability πF,πP ∈ [0,1]
Intuitively, the program above states that the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt. Employees contribute
to ﬁrm proﬁt by providing the high output C, with probability (θ + δ) in the ﬁrst period. In
the second period managers and employees both contribute to ﬁrm proﬁtability. Each manager
contributes to the proﬁtb yM, and their number is 1/H, employees produce F output.
In exchange, employees are compensated. The ﬁrm pays ﬁxed wages (w) with certainty, and
bonuses (b) with probability (θ+δ).I na d d i t i o n ,t h eﬁrm has to incur costs of turnover (K) from
two sources. First, the ﬁrm ﬁres badly performing employees with probability πF. Second, the
ﬁrm has to hire (either directly to management or employee level) volume 1/H employees either
to ﬁll management positions or to replace promoted employees. Finally, manager and employee
pay is normalized to zero in the second period, so it is not displayed.
The IC-constraint implies that the employee accepting the contract is better oﬀ by exerting
the ﬁrst-best high eﬀort in the ﬁrst period. The left-hand side shows the worker’s utility given
eﬀort. The employee receives the ﬁxed wage (w), and incurs the cost of eﬀort (e).F u r t h e r m o r e ,
the probability (θ + δ) of high output leads to a relatively high probability of receiving bonus
payments (b) and promotion (πP), which provides utility (UP). Also, the employee has a lower
probability (1−θ−δ)πF of being ﬁred, and hereby incurring the disutility (UF). The right-hand
side shows the worker’s compensation without eﬀort-exertion. Here the chances for bonuses and
6Modeling managerial incentives is thus entirely absent from the model. The reason is twofold. First, it suﬃces
for our theoretical point to show the emergence of the observed incentive mix at the employee level. Second, as
our data is sparse on managers, the theoretical results would be impossible to test.
7This can be interpreted as moderate form of risk aversion.
6promotions are lower (θ), and that of ﬁring (1 − θ)πF is higher. Thus, in principle, bonuses,
promotions, and ﬁring are used to induce eﬀort.
The IR- c o n s t r a i n ts t a t e st h a tt h ee m p l o y e ei sb e t t e ro ﬀ accepting the contract. The left-hand
side of the equation is the same as in the IC-constraint, i.e., the utility with exerting eﬀort. This
utility must exceed the utility of the employee’s outside option (¯ U).
The other constraints follow from the assumptions directly. Wages and bonuses must be
non-negative, as the non-negativity constraints say. Finally, conditional ﬁring and promotion
probabilities must be on the unit interval.
2.2 Solving the basic model
Notice ﬁrst, that in equilibrium the promotion constraint (P) is always binding.8 If P is slack,
then the ﬁrm can increase promotions, and in exchange decrease bonuses, ﬁxed wages, costly ﬁring
or it can increase employee welfare. The ﬁrm can increase its proﬁts, if ﬁxed wages, bonuses or
the ﬁring parameter are non-zero. Even if all of them take zero values, the ﬁrm can increase the
welfare of its employees without additional costs. Thus, in equilibrium in the basic model the P
constraint is binding. In other words, there is ports of entry as suggested in Doeringer and Piore
[1971].
Furthermore, by deﬁnition the observed incentive mix arises only if all four parameters are set
to non-zero values. Thus, it is enough to focus our attention to binding IR-a n dIC-constraints.
To see that consider the following. First, in proﬁt maximizing equilibrium the individual ratio-
nality (IR) constraint binds or the wage is set to zero. If it does not bind, then the wage must
be zero else the ﬁrm would reduce the ﬁxed wage, and thereby increase its proﬁt.
Similarly, the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) b i n d so rt h eb o n u si ss e tt oz e r oi n
equilibrium. If the IC-constraint does not bind, then the bonus must be zero else the ﬁrm
would decrease bonus payments. If IR-constraint binds, the ﬁrm can lower bonus payments (and
increase ﬁxed wages) to make the employees better oﬀ.I ft h eIR-constraint does not bind, the
ﬁrm can lower bonus payments without wage compensation and increase proﬁts.
In sum, the observed incentive mix can only arise, when all the IR-, IC-a n dP-constraints
bind. Consequently, whenever the observed incentive mix is possible, the original four-parameter
incentive problem is reduced to a single-parameter optimization. Expressing the proﬁta sa
function of πF, the ﬁrst-order condition reveals that the objective function is maximized when
the ﬁring rate is minimized and set to zero. Thus, the observed incentive mix cannot arise in the
basic model.
The intuition is that ﬁring is more costly than bonuses to motivate workers. Firing creates
two social costs: cost of hiring and utility loss of ﬁring. In equilibrium, these two costs are born
by the ﬁrm. Consequently, ﬁring is necessarily set to zero. Lemma (1) summarizes the result.
The proof of the lemma is provided in the appendix as well as the proof of other statements.
Lemma 1 In the basic model incentives are given through bonuses and promotions, but not
through ﬁring. Thus, the observed incentive-mix does not arise.
The results of the basic model also can be interpreted as evidence for a hierarchy of incentives.
The ﬁrm prefers to use promotions, because they exploit costless residual rents. If additional
8Binding P constraint implies a less than unity promotion parameter by the restriction on H.
7incentives are needed (to satisfy the IC-constraint), then the ﬁrm turns to using bonuses. Finally,
to ensure worker participation (and to satisfy the IR-constraint), the ﬁrm uses ﬁxed wages, but
only if bonuses and promotions are insuﬃcient. Firing, however, is never used, because of its
cost-disadvantage.
Finally, a few words about rents in the model. There is no ex-ante rent by assumption (as the
individual rationality constraint (IR) is binding). However, the fact that ﬁring causes disutilities
(UF) shows that interim there is rent. The interpretation is, that even though the worker is
initially indiﬀerent between the ﬁrm’s oﬀer and other oﬀers, going back to the labor market and
starting to search is costly. Thus, interim, there is rent from retaining the job, and the ﬁrm can
exploit this feature to motivate the worker. Lemma (1) states, however, that motivating through
layoﬀs is more costly than motivating through bonus payments.
3 Job-assignment model
In this section, the basic model is extended to accommodate employee heterogeneity. The proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrm is now concerned about job assignment, because the quality of the workforce and
the allocation of employees to jobs (non-management vs. management jobs) are important for
the ﬁrm’s overall productivity. This implies that the ﬁrm has an additional motivation (besides
incentive purposes) to promote and to lay oﬀ employees, as the two devices can be used to adjust
the quality of the workforce at both hierarchical levels.9
The job-assignment model is used for two purposes. First, it is shown that sorting and
selection considerations lead to the observed incentive mix. Second, the model is utilized to
characterize the career path of individual employees. This proves to be useful for testing the
model’s predictions.
3.1 The observed incentive mix
Potential employees are heterogeneous. There are good employees (G), with high ability, and
bad ones (B), with low ability. The good employees are more likely to produce a high output, as
compared with the bad employees, i.e., θG >θ B. However, neither the ﬁrm nor the employee is
able to observe the ability of the employee. Consequently, employees (both good- and bad-ability
ones) face a single outside option, providing utility ¯ U.10
The ﬁrm’s external labor market consists of a proportion µ of high-ability individuals. Since
the ﬁrm can use promotions and layoﬀs to sort and select employees in the ﬁrst period, second
period employee composition can diﬀer from the composition in the external labor market. For
this reason, the proportion of high-ability types in the second period at the non-management
level of the ﬁrm is denoted by µF, and the proportion of high-ability types at the management
level is denoted by µM.
Furthermore, we assume that employee quality aﬀects production in the second period. Both
managerial (M) and employee (F) output is assumed to depend on workforce quality: µM and µF
9Furthermore, we continue to assume that sorting is based on performance in the job assigment model. The
assumption is without the loss of generailty as discussed in the appendix.
10Mutually unknown ability can be thought of modeling fresh college graduates entering a ﬁrm. The gradu-
ates might not have signiﬁcant information advantage, because they do not know the actual work environment.
Nevertheless, as it is discussed later, the information structure provides a promising avenue for future research.
8respectively. The output functions are assumed to be twice diﬀerentiable: The ﬁrst derivatives
are assumed to be positive: M0,F0 > 0 and the second derivatives negative:11 F00,M00 < 0.
Furthermore, managerial quality is assumed to be weakly more important than employee quality,
formally M(x) ≥ F(x) and M0(x) ≥ F0(x):∀x ∈ [0,1].
First, the contracting problem is outlined. As prospective employees do not know their ability,
the ﬁrm is unable to write a contract to elicit self-selection ex-ante. Thus, necessarily a pooling





+[ θB + µ(θG − θB)+δ](C − b)+F(µF) − w (3)




(IC) b + πPUP + πFUF ≥
e
δ
(IR) w − e +( θB + µ(θG − θB)+δ)[b + πPUP] − (1 − θB − µ(θG − θB) − δ)πFUF ≥ ¯ U
(P)( θB + µ(θG − θB)+δ)πP ≤
1
H
non-negativity 0 ≤ w,b
probability πF,πP ∈ [0,1]
Second, managerial and employee second period equilibrium composition is determined in
Lemma (2).
Lemma 2 In the second period, the equilibrium proportion of good workers (µF) in the non-
management level depends on the ﬁring and promotion probabilities:
µF = µ + µ(1 − µ)(θG − θB)(πF − πP) (4)
Moreover, the proportion of good quality workers at the managerial level (µM) is determined as:
µM = µ(θG + δ)πPH + µ(1 − πPH (θB + µ(θG − θB)+δ)) (5)
Furthermore, µF increases in the ﬁring rate.
The ﬁrst term in equation (4) states that employee quality is aﬀected by the original quality
(µ). The second term summarizes the eﬀects of on-the-job selection. In particular, it shows
that employee heterogeneity aﬀects the eﬃciency of the selection regime. Heterogeneity can be
measured as the diﬀerence between the abilities of good and bad employees (θG − θB),a n da l s o
by the variance of the distribution of the two types (µ(1 − µ)). Firing (πF) aﬀects employee
quality positively, as ﬁring is more likely to weed out bad employees. Promotion (πP),h o w e v e r ,
decreases quality, because better employees are more likely to be promoted.
Managerial quality depends on the quality of employees promoted from the employee level
and the quality of those hired from outside. The ﬁrst term in (5) shows the eﬀect of promotions.
11This corresponds to assuming that the marginal return to quality is decreasing.
12The IC-constraint displayed below saves on notation and it is a straightforward simpliﬁcation.
9The second term summarizes the quality eﬀects of hiring from outside of the ﬁrm As only well-
performing agents are promoted, employees promoted from inside are on average better than
managers hired from outside of the ﬁrm.
To solve the model notice again, that the promotion constraint (P) is binding in equilib-
rium. The ﬁrm would like to promote as many well-performing employees as possible to increase
either ﬁrm proﬁt or employee well-being as in the basic model. Furthermore, job assignment
considerations are also calling for promoting high performers instead of hiring untested outsiders
into management. Promoting high-output employees improves on the equilibrium composition
of the managerial rank through equation (5) in Lemma (2). On the other hand, the increased
promotions decrease employee composition by equation (4). However, the net eﬀect of promoting
high performers is positive, because second period managerial quality is more important than
employee quality: M(x) >F(x) and M0(x) ≥ F0(x):∀x ∈ [0,1].. In sum, ports of entry prevail
also in the job assuagement model.
Furthermore, if the observed incentive mix prevails, then again the IR-a n dIC-constraints
must bind. The logic is the same as in the basic model.
Consequently, the observed incentive mix can only arise if all the three constraints are binding.
Assume for now and verify later, that the observed incentive mix can arise. Given the binding
constraints, the proﬁt function can be expressed as a function of the ﬁring parameter (πF).T h e
proﬁt maximizing ﬁrst order condition with respect to πF can be expressed as:
∂F
∂µF
µ(1 − µ)(θG − θB)=[ 1− θB − µ(θG − θB) − δ](UF + K) (6)
The left hand side of (6) summarizes the gains from ﬁring. Gains from ﬁring are indirect and
stem from improved employee quality in the second period. The term ∂F
∂µF > 0 shows that this
indirect eﬀect is positive. The right hand side of equation (6) summarizes the costs of ﬁring. The
term shows that the higher the expected level of ﬁring, the higher the ﬁrm’s costs are. First,
employees need higher compensation to join the workforce in order to oﬀset expected job search
costs. Second, the ﬁrm incurs higher training costs, because of the increased turnover.
The ﬁrst order condition shows that in the job assignment model ﬁring is not set necessarily
to zero. The observed incentive mix arises in the following case. First, the implied optimal ﬁring
rate by equation (6) and the corresponding second order condition is on the (0,1] interval.13 The
condition is satisﬁed, if the left hand side of the ﬁrst order condition exceeds the right hand side
at some πF ∈ (0,1] value. Remember, that promotion is positive by the binding P constraint.
Second, the ﬁrm pays positive bonuses only if promotion and ﬁring does not provide strong
enough incentives. Third, the ﬁrm pays positive wages only if the promotions, ﬁring and bonuses
do not compensate for the outside job oﬀer. Lemma (3) summarizes when the observed incentive
mix can arise.
Lemma 3 In the job-assignment model an observed incentive mix of ﬁxed wages, bonuses, pro-
motions, and ﬁring arises in equilibrium, if the following three conditions are satisﬁed. First, π∗
F




H(θB + µ(θG − θB)+δ)
13Note that the second derivates are necessarily negative (as F00 < 0), thus the ﬁrst order condition suﬃces for
the analysis.
10and π∗









F,b∗ positive ﬁxed wages (w∗) are needed for employees to accept the contract
w∗ = ¯ U − (θB + µ(θG − θB))[b∗ + π∗
PUP]+( 1− θB − µ(θG − θB))π∗
FUF > 0
The results in Lemma (3) is explicit about the hierarchy of incentives. In the job assignment
model, promotions and ﬁrings are used ﬁrst.14 Second, remaining incentives are provided through
bonuses. Finally, wages are used to make the employee accept the ﬁrm’s oﬀer.
3.2 Characterizing employee careers
In the above discussion, it is established that in a ﬁrm where the optimal contract involves
paying an incentive mix, composition and allocation of the workforce is important for proﬁt
maximization. We used Lemma (2) to establish the relation between the oﬀered incentives, in
particular ﬁring and the composition of the workforce. Lemma (2), however, is silent about the
consequences of these policies for individual workers.
Promotions and layoﬀsa ﬀect the ﬁrm’s selection scheme. As these decisions are based on
employee performance, they have diﬀerent consequences for high- and low-ability employees.
In particular, for the high-ability worker, the probability of being ﬁr e di na n yg i v e np e r i o di s
(1 − θG − δ)πF, and for the low-ability worker, the probability is (1 − θB − δ)πF. Hence, it is
more likely that the bad worker loses his job. By the same logic, good workers are more likely
to be promoted, as (θG + δ)πP > (θB + δ)πP.
This allows for investigating the eﬀects of the optimal contract on selection in rank and
tenure. Selection on rank is always positive, as well-performing agents, who are more likely to be
of good quality than the average employee, are promoted. Selection on tenure depends upon the
relative strength of ﬁring and promotion. Firing weeds out the low-ability employees, whereas
promotions weed out the high-ability employees from the non-management ranks. These results
are formalized in Lemma (4).
Lemma 4 The selection process in the ﬁrm is positive in rank (conditional on tenure). Selection




Previous studies have analyzed the selection mechanism Medoﬀ and Abraham [1980, 1981],
Lazear [1992], Gibbs [1995], and Gibbons and Waldman [1999b]. For instance, based on a series
of empirical ﬁndings, Medoﬀ and Abraham [1980, 1981] write “... the negative within-grade-level
correlation which we suspect exists between experience and ability.” Lazear [1992] continues this
14For the sake of completeness note, that if there are no bonus payments (the IC-constraint is satisﬁed with
slack in equilibrium), then not equation (6) will determine optimal ﬁring.
11discussion, arguing that “Individuals who remain on the job longer, do worse than those who
are promoted out early. Wages actually decline with job tenure, probably reﬂecting the fall in
the average worker’s quality with length of time in the job.” In the context of our model, it is
clear that if only selection due to promotions is at work, the quality of the workforce that is
passed over for promotion will decline with tenure. The optimal contract, however, shows that
the ﬁrm has incentives to lay oﬀ a proportion of the low-performing workers each period. That
this behavior aﬀects the selection process is a point that is often missed in the literature. Gibbs
[1995] comes closest to this point, and concludes that “... employees are continuously selected out
through promotions, demotions, or exits. Because of these selection eﬀects, ability of the group
should decline with tenure...”
From this discussion, it is clear that negative selection on tenure is a possibility, but not the
rule. If the ﬁring probability exceeds the promotion probability, the selection scheme in tenure
shifts from negative to positive. As it will turn out in the empirical analysis conducted below, our
ﬁrm has a positive selection on tenure (conditional on rank), which provides a counterexample
to the earlier conclusions drawn about negative within-rank employee selection.
3.3 Comparative statics
Employee sorting is important, not only for the observed incentive mix to be an optimal contract,
but also because the selection regime predicts the outcome of other key variables in the ﬁrm.
This makes it interesting to understand what components in the underlying market structure
will lead to a particular selection regime.
Examining the ﬁrst order condition (6) provides interesting comparative statics. On the one
hand, variables on the left hand side in general contribute to more ﬁring. First, the stronger long
run employee output (F) responds to quality improvements, the more the ﬁrm is interested in
improving the quality of its workforce. Second, employee heterogeneity also increases the ﬁring
rate. Employee heterogeneity can be measured as the variance of diﬀerent types, µ(1−µ),w h e r e
larger heterogeneity corresponds to µ values closer to 1/2 or a 50-50 split. Employee heterogeneity
can also be measured by the quality diﬀerence between the high- and the low-ability individuals
(θG−θB). Both measures of heterogeneity increase the indirect gains from ﬁring. Intuitively, the
more heterogeneous newly hired employees are, the more is to gain from on-the-job sorting.15
On the other hand, variables on the right hand side of (6) decrease ﬁring. The social costs
of ﬁring (UF and K) have a negative eﬀect on the ﬁring rate. Hence, it reduces the likelihood of
positive selection. This follows from the fact that the ﬁrm shoulders all the costs of turnover in
equilibrium. A reduction of these costs, however, implies that the ﬁrm can rely more on ﬁring.
This discussion indicates that the value of production, employee quality and variation in the
cost of ﬁring, are important determinants for the ﬁrm’s choice of selection scheme. Variation
in these parameters across time, sectors, and economies will be useful predictors for the type of
selection that will be observed in ﬁrms.
15Note, that the heterogeneity measure µ(1 − µ)(θG − θB) is the ﬁrst derivative of the second period employee
quality (µF) with respect to the ﬁring parameter (πF).
123.4 Empirical predictions
The model can be interpreted as capturing the selection and incentive procedure ongoing in the
ﬁrm as the model identiﬁes the criteria for positive and negative selection on tenure (conditional
on rank). Selection further allows for the formulation of predictions about other key variables.
Having this interpretation in mind, the model provides two main additional empirical predictions
besides producing the observed incentive mix.
First, bonus payments can be used to test for selection in the ﬁrm. A basic assumption of the
model is that the ﬁrm rewards high performance with bonuses. Thus, the ﬁrm’s selection scheme
has direct consequences for the way bonuses are paid to the individuals. For instance, in the
positive selection case, the probability of being high-ability is increasing in tenure and rank, and
thus the probability of receiving bonuses is also increasing in tenure.16 If the ﬁrm has a negative
selection, the probability of receiving bonuses would decrease in tenure.
Second, selection also has implications for the evolution of promotions and layoﬀs in tenure.
Given that promotions are conditioned on high output, with positive selection promotions are
predicted to increase in tenure. Similarly, with positive selection layoﬀs are expected to decrease
in tenure.
These predictions are outlined below, and they will be tested empirically in the following
sections. The predictions are derived directly from the basic assumptions of the model and its
lemmas, so they are not proven formally again.
Predictions 1 (Sorting) Sorting based on performance is a necessary condition for the
observed incentive-mix of ﬁxed wages, bonuses, promotions, and ﬁring to be an optimal contract.
Prediction 2 (Selection) The ﬁrm has a positive selection on rank (conditional on tenure).
Furthermore, it has a positive selection on tenure (conditional on rank), if and only if πF >π P.
Otherwise, it has a negative selection on tenure.
Prediction 3 (Bonus) The probability of receiving a bonus depends positively upon the
employees’ ability. Thus, with ports of entry, the likelihood of receiving a bonus increases in rank.
Furthermore, the probability of receiving a bonus is increasing in tenure, if and only if the ﬁrm
has a positive selection on tenure.
Prediction 4 (Promotion) The likelihood of being promoted depends positively,upon the
employees’ ability. Thus, the probability of being promoted increases in tenure, if and only if the
ﬁrm has a positive selection on tenure.
Prediction 5 (Firing) The likelihood of being ﬁred depends negatively upon the employees’
ability. Thus, the probability of being ﬁred declines in tenure, if and only if the ﬁrm has a positive
selection on tenure.
4D a t a
Four years of monthly personnel records from the main production site of an international phar-
maceutical company are used in the empirical analysis.17 Average full-time employment in the
16From this prediction it follows that positve selection could imply an increasing earnings proﬁle.
17The study is conducted on monthly observations, in contrast to yearly observations. The main motivation for
doing this is that the timing of events within a year proves to be important. In the regression results presented
below, a “correction” for the use of high-frequency data is made by using clustered standard errors.
13ﬁrm over the period 1997 to 2000 is 5055 persons.18 These workers are distributed across four hi-
erarchical levels, ranging from CEO to non-management see Figure 2. The share of management
workers in the ﬁrm is 4.75 percent, on average, over the four years.
The analysis given below uses only those individuals who participate in the performance-pay
system, i.e., the employees who, besides their base salary, can get a bonus, given suﬃciently high
performance evaluations. The distinction between strictly ﬁxed paid employees, and employees
having bonus options, can be made by looking at the worker’s job category. This exercise reveals
that the group of ﬁxed-paid employees constitutes 38.66 percent of the workforce, and that it
mainly consists of production workers.
 
CEO 
Executive vice presidents 







Full time permanent employees 
(4814 persons) 
Figure 2: The hierarchy of the ﬁrm, 1997 to 2000
The characteristics of the employees calculated from the monthly employee-based observations
are presented in the second and third columns of Table 2. On average, the employees included
in the analysis, i.e., those who participate in the performance-pay system (column 3), have 8.73
years of tenure. The same group of individuals consists of 60.80 percent women, and the average
age is 39.23 years.
The level of education in the ﬁrm is high. In fact, 22.0 percent of the employees have at
least a master’s degree, and 11.6 percent have a degree that corresponds to a bachelor’s degree
in duration. Only 12.6 percent of the labor force is unskilled.19 There are three reasons why
this structure is observed. First, the ﬁrm is operating in an industry where product development
is essential for survival. Hence, a large proportion of the workforce is engaged in research and
development. Second, production is highly automated, suggesting that low-skilled labor has
been substituted by capital. Finally, in order to comply with the regulations from the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), extensive quality-control programs are implemented, which require
skilled labor.
18The analysis is focused on permanent full-time employment, which corresponds to 92.66 percent of all indi-
v i d u a l se m p l o y e do nt h ep r o d u c t i o ns i t e .
19Information on education is missing for 8.21 percent of the employees. However, for the group of employees
receiving performance pay, only 2.84 percent have missing information on education.
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Tenure 10 to 15 years  0.165 
 
0.186 
Tenure 15 to 25 years  0.133 
 
0.141 





Table 2: Descriptive statistics
4.1 The empirical contract, and the theoretical assumptions
According to the ﬁrm’s oﬃcial remuneration principles, it oﬀers wages to the employee such
that: “The base salary is a competitive pay for job function, responsibilities and competencies.”
The data provide evidence for the fact that this principle is taken seriously. For instance, a
preliminary analysis of the ﬁxed-wage component reveals that a set of individual characteristics





Individuals are rewarded for actual performance through a bonus system. The allocation
of bonuses fulﬁlls the criteria that: “The principles, criteria and targets that will lead to bonus
payments should be known by the relevant employee subgroup.” The size of the bonus pool varies
across the diﬀerent employee subgroups, and constitutes 2.5 to 4 percent of the wage sum for
non-management workers, and 8 percent for non-executive managers.20 The bonus system is
widespread, and according to the data, 24 percent of workers in non-management receive bonus
payments in a given year. The numbers are closer to 75 and 80 percent for managers and
vice-presidents, respectively.
The institutional settings impose no restriction on who to ﬁre, and the ﬁrm seems to use ﬁring
frequently. The ﬁrm’s yearly separation rate is 10.96 percent. The turnover is costly for the ﬁrm,
but nevertheless, 12.64 percent of all separations are initiated by the ﬁrm through layoﬀs. The
separation rate for the employees participating in the performance-pay system is 6.64 percent.
20The subsequent analysis is based on non-management employees, managers, and vice-presidents. The execu-
tive management is omitted, due to lack of data.
15Of these, 19.46 (!) percent are initiated by the ﬁrm. Thus, ﬁring is a signiﬁcant component of
the observed incentive mix.
There are two motivations for laying oﬀ workers. First, the ﬁrm’s oﬃcial wage strategy is
to: “Oﬀer attractive salary and employment conditions" in order to “attract, develop and retain
qualiﬁed employees.” Given the “attractive” wages, the ﬁrm can use the threat of a layoﬀ to
motivate the workers.21 Second, the layoﬀs serve as a sorting device, where a proportion of the
employees with low performers are forced to separate from the ﬁrm in each period. Hence, in a
pooling equilibrium where both high- and low-ability workers are employed by the ﬁrm, layoﬀs
can be used to control the worker composition.
Finally, the ﬁrm has ports of entry as the binding P constraint implies. This claim is based
on the observation that 98.22 percent of the employees are hired into the lowest hierarchical
level. One implication of ports of entry is that management vacancies are ﬁlled with incumbent
employees. Naturally this policy serves both sorting and incentive purposes. The wage premium
(unconditional on human capital) associated with a promotion from non-management and into
lower-and middle-management are 52.46 percent and 85.65 percent, respectively.
In the presentation of the ﬁrm, it becomes clear that the contract oﬀered to the workers
is highly complex in nature. First, the ﬁrm pays ﬁxed wages to all workers who accept the
contract, unconditional on performance. Second, 62 percent of the employees can be rewarded
for performance through a bonus system. Third, even though turnover is costly for the ﬁrm, a
signiﬁcant part of separations is ﬁrm-initiated, i.e., layoﬀs. Finally, the ﬁrm has ports of entry,
which implies that promotions to higher-level jobs take place (mainly) from the pool of incumbent
employees. In sum, the data describes a contract that contains four incentive parameters: w, b,
πP, and πF.
5 Empirical analysis
The predictions stated above will be tested empirically in this section. A ﬁrst goal is to establish
that the ﬁrm is sorting its employees. According to the job-assignment model, this is a necessary
condition for the observed incentive mix to be an optimal contract. Secondly, the ﬁrm’s selection
scheme is identiﬁed to be positive in rank and tenure. This information provides predictions
about other key variables in the ﬁrm, such as earnings growth, bonus payments, ﬁring, and
promotions. For this reason, a test of the model’s broader predictions will be conducted in the
ﬁnal part of the analysis.
Prediction (1) stated that employee sorting based on performance is a necessary condition
for the incentive mix to be an optimal contract. Preliminary evidence for sorting is found in
the description of the empirical contract where it is established that layoﬀs and promotions are
common in the ﬁrm, i.e., πP,πF > 0. T h ep r e s e n c eo fl a y o ﬀs and promotions are necessary
conditions for sorting, but are not suﬃcient in the sense that random decisions would produce
no sorting. Thus, a ﬁrst test for the presence of sorting is to investigate whether the ﬁrm makes
random decisions, or whether it bases its decisions on information about the employee’s revealed
performance (and thus on expected ability). The measure of performance that will be used in
21All workers in the ﬁrm have deﬁned contribution pension plans, hence a layoﬀ will not change the value of the
current pension account. In other ﬁrms, where workers have deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans, the costs of a layoﬀ in
terms of lost pension may be signiﬁcant. This eﬀect could potentially create large incentives in other ﬁrms.
16t h ea n a l y s i si sb o n u sp a y m e n t s . 22
To establish that the ﬁrm is sorting, a multinomial logit model is estimated. In the model,
the individual is facing the three options: stay within rank, promotion, and, layoﬀ.23 The point
estimates of a multinomial logit are diﬃcult to interpret, and, hence, the results of the model are
evaluated using its predictions.24 The eﬀect of a bonus payment on the transition probabilities is
presented in Table 3. A person who receives a bonus payment (i.e., who’s had high performance)
has a 0.136 percent chance of being promoted in a given month, while the layoﬀ probability
is as low as 0.025 percent. In contrast, a person who did not receive a bonus payment (low
performance) has little chance of being promoted, and faces a 0.241 percent risk of being laid oﬀ
from the ﬁrm in any given month.25 Hence, a bonus payment increases the promotion probability,
with 0.072, percent and reduces the ﬁring probability, with 0.216 percent. This is clear evidence
for the fact that the ﬁring and promotion decisions are based on employee performance, meaning
the ﬁrm is consciously sorting its employees.
   Destinations 
  Promotion
  Layoff
  Stay within rank
 
Average transition probability 







      
Average transition probability 
given bonus is received. 
0.136 %  0.025 %   
      
Average transition probability 
given no bonus is received. 
0.064 %  0.241 %   
      
Change in probability due to 
bonus 
0.072 %  - 0.216 %   
Note: The predictions are based on a regression with 96,639 observations. See the appendix for the full 
regression results. 
Table 3: Predicted monthly transitions
Prediction (2) gave conditions when sorting is positive or negative. They can be tested from
the empirical evidence presented in Table 3. First, the results reveal that high-performance
employees are relatively more likely to be promoted. Since high-ability individuals are more
likely to have a high performance, this ﬁnding provides evidence for a selection scheme that is
positive on rank. Second, the conditional layoﬀ probability (πF =0 .241 percent) exceeds the
conditional promotion probability (πP =0 .136 percent). According to Lemma (4), this implies
a positive selection on tenure.
Moreover, the positive selection might be even stronger than shown by these numbers, due
to a bias in the layoﬀ data. A bias arises in the case where the ﬁr mi ss i g n a l i n gt ot h ew o r k e r
that the employment relation will end in the near future. This signal will make the worker
look for alternative employment, which may be obtained before the ﬁrm terminates the match.
22Bonuses paid to the individual during the preceeding 12 months are used as an indicator for performance,
i.e., if the individual received a bonus payment in the period, he or she must have had high performance.
23It should be noted that the individuals who separate for natural causes, such as retirement or death, and the
individuals who leave the ﬁrm for a new job have been deleted from the sample.
24The full regression results of the multinomial logit can be seen in Table 8 in the appendix.
25The unconditional yearly promotion probability in the ﬁrm is 1.34 percent. In comparison, Lazear (1992)
observes a yearly promotion probability close to 2 percent.
17From conversations with the ﬁrm, we have reason to believe that this procedure is common.
The implication is that the layoﬀso b s e r v e di nt h eﬁrm only constitute a lower bound on the
separations, that, in reality are layoﬀs.26
Prediction (3) focuses on bonus payments. Since the likelihood of receiving bonuses depends
upon employee ability, the selection scheme used by the ﬁrm, and the probability of receiving
a bonus are closely linked. One consequence of the positive selection identiﬁed in the ﬁrm is
that more able workers in general will have longer tenure, and will be assigned to higher-rank
jobs. Hence, with positive selection, employees who have longer job tenure and who are located
at higher ranks (conditional on tenure) will be more likely to receive bonus payments. This
observation provides a ﬁrst test for the model’s broader predictions.
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Skilled worker     0.383 
(0.158) 
 
Short theoretical education    0.442 
(0.156) 
 
Bachelor degree    0.401 
(0.163) 
 





     
Demographic  variables  YES YES YES 
Job  category  YES YES YES 
Time  dummies  YES YES YES 
     
Log  likelihood  -5964 -5954 -1882 
#  observations  10,801 10,801 10,801 
Note: Standard errors are clustered with respect to individuals in the cross sectional models. 
Table 4: Logit regression for bonus payments
26For the sake of completeness, we remark here that selection might get weakened by employee-initiated turnover.
High-ability employees, who are underappreciated, might leave the ﬁr mf o rb e t t e ro ﬀers. This, however, does not
seem to be a serious problem, as it would require outside ﬁrms to have systematically better information than
the current employer. It seems, then, that employee-initiated endogenous turnover (if any) is about terminating
a bad match, rather than about ability.
18Table 4 presents logit regressions for the probability of having received a bonus payment
during the preceding year. In the ﬁrst model, tenure, rank and demographic information (gender,
age and age squared) are included as explanatory variables, together with dummies for job
category and time. As expected, both tenure and rank have signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects on the
probability of receiving bonuses.
In model 2, information on education is added. The positive relation between educational
attainment and ability, and the increased production capacity of educated workers, implies that
workers with higher levels of schooling will be more likely to receive bonus payments see Becker
[1964]. This result is conﬁrmed by the data. Important for the analysis, however, is to note that
the positive eﬀects of tenure and rank on the probability of receiving bonuses survive in model
2. This indicates that ability is signaled only partially through education. Thus, sorting and
selection considerations are important, even though the level of formal schooling is observed.27
An additional test for the relation between tenure and bonus is conducted by estimating a
model similar to model 2 in Table 4, with the tenure categories substituted for yearly tenure
dummies (detailed results are not shown).28 Figure 3 illustrates the cross-sectional eﬀect of
tenure on the likelihood of receiving a bonus for the ﬁrst 25 years of tenure. In accordance with
the predictions from positive sorting, the eﬀect is increasing. Thus, the steady increase in the
likelihood of receiving bonuses during the ﬁrst many years of employment reﬂects that sorting
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Figure 3: Tenure-eﬀect on the likelihood of receiving bonus payments
Finally, the cross-sectional relation between the probability of getting a bonus and tenure
could arise if a bonus is paid for tenure, and not for performance, as we argue in the model. For
this reason, a ﬁxed-eﬀects model, where the individual’s ability is “conditioned out” is estimated,
model 3 in Table 4. In this model, the tenure eﬀect is insigniﬁcant, reﬂecting that ability, and
27The tenure-eﬀect identiﬁed in Table 4 could, in principle, be driven by the fact that managerial employees,
who, in general, have longer tenure, are more likely to recieve bonuses. For this reason, model (3) has been
estimated for the non-management employees only. The results show that the tenure eﬀect is robust.
28The maximum level of tenure in the ﬁrm is 44 years, but less than 3.25 percent of the employees have a tenure
above 25 years, causing large standard errors on the point estimates of the tenure dummies exceeding the 25th
year.
19not tenure, determines the probability of receiving bonus payments. This ﬁnding allows us to
conclude that the increasing cross-sectional bonus-tenure proﬁle observed in the data is driven
by positive selection.29
Predictions (4) and (5) state the model’s predictions on promotions and layoﬀs. The positive
selection identiﬁed in the ﬁrm implies that non-management employees with longer tenure are of
higher average ability than more recently hired individuals. Above it is argued that this will lead
to higher average performance of the tenured employees, and consequently to a higher probability
of promotion. Since the tenure-eﬀect on promotions is working through the performance variable,
taking the employees performance into account would remove the tenure-eﬀect, allowing only
p e r f o r m a n c et oh a v eas i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on promotions. A similar argument goes for the layoﬀ
probability. The expected higher average performance of the high-tenured individuals will at
ﬁrst create a negative relation between layoﬀs and tenure. However, conditional on performance,
tenure will become insigniﬁcant.
These hypotheses are tested empirically using logit models for the probability of being pro-
moted and laid oﬀ. The results are presented in Table 5. A ﬁrst observation is that promotions
and layoﬀs are very diﬃcult to predict if information on performance is missing. In model 1,
where the probability of a promotion is estimated unconditional of employee performance, the
expected tenure-eﬀect, is absent. Instead, there is a weak indication that skills are important
for the promotion process, since individuals with a master’s or a Ph.D. degree have a marginally
higher probability of being promoted than do unskilled workers. This result, however, is washed
out, when conditioning on performance (model 2), indicating that education is important for
the promotion process, but only through its positive eﬀect on the likelihood of getting bonuses.
This leads to the conclusion that the ﬁrm only promotes workers who have shown persistent
high-performance, and that the direct eﬀect of tenure on promotions is too weak to be identiﬁed
in the present ﬁrm.
The ﬁrst layoﬀ regression (model 3) in Table 5 shows a pattern similar to the promotion-
regression, namely, that layoﬀsa r ed i ﬃcult to predict if information on performance is absent.
In model 4, it is reestablished that information on bonus payments has a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the decision about who to lay oﬀ. Also, there is an indication that layoﬀs are rare for newly
hired individuals, i.e., employees with tenure less than two years.
An additional point that arises from the results is that some employee subgroups (deﬁned
by education) are more likely to be laid oﬀ than others. This result seems to stay, even when
performance is taken into account. This empirical result, however, may simply be an artifact of
missing lay-oﬀ information. The indicator of layoﬀs observed in the data only reﬂects a lower
bound on the real extent of layoﬀs (as discussed above). In particular, the empirical result
observed will emerge if the ﬁrm is more likely to signal that an employment match is about to
29The models presented in the table provide detailed evidence of the tenure eﬀect on bonus payments due to
the inclusion of the six tenure categories. The details come at the cost, however, that the standard errors for
each tenure group becomes fairly high, and may question whether the groups are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent or not. To
anticipate this criticism, the appendix (Table 8) provides estimates of models similar to those presented in Table
4, but where the category dummies are substituted for a linear tenure eﬀect. These regressions show that the
tenure-eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant and positive in the cross-sectional models, and insigniﬁcant in the ﬁxed-eﬀects
models. Hence, they resemble the results of the table. The regressions also show that these results are not driven
by the very low probability of getting bonus payments for newly hired employees (whose tenure is less than one
or two years).
20end, to some employee subgroups relative to others. In this particular case, it is explained if
skilled workers (typically production workers) are more likely to get this information than other
employee subgroups. This can be due to increased sensitivity of information handled by more
educated employees. Given the available data, we can only speculate about these matters.
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Demographic  variables  YES YES YES YES 
Time  dummies  YES YES YES YES 
      
Log  likelihood  -749.86 -744.54 -768.83 -723.03 
#  observations  66,655 66,655 96,639 96,639 
Note: Standard errors are clustered with respect to individuals. In the period studied individuals with a short theoretical 
education are not promoted. These regressions consider only transitions out of non-management.
Table 5: Layoﬀ and promotion regressions
In sum, the empirical evidence presented above provides evidence for the model’s predictions.
First, using the description of the empirical contract and the multinomial logit regression, it is
established that the ﬁrm is sorting, such that high-performing employees are more likely to be
promoted, and, subsequently, are less likely, to be ﬁred. Furthermore, these results show that the
ﬁrm is using a selection scheme that is positive in both tenure and rank. Using the information
on sorting and selection then, the model provides prediction about other key variables. The
broader predictions related to bonus payments, earnings growth, promotions, and layoﬀsa r ea l l
supported by the data.
6 Discussion
In the seminal work by Gibbons and Waldman [1999a,b], they argue that: “Any single (empirical)
fact may be consistent with a variety of theories, so one way to choose among theories is by
21evaluating the extent to which each is consistent with a broad pattern of (empirical) evidence.”
This paper has attempted to do exactly that.
As to the initial research question of how the incentive-mix observed in ﬁrms can be seen as
an optimal contract, this paper focuses on the job-assignment model. Within this context, it is
argued that the ﬁrm’s sorting and selection concerns, and its interest in creating incentives for
employees, provide the answer. This is a contribution in a theoretical sense, but according to the
Gibbons and Waldman critique, the true test of the model lies in its ability to predict additional
empirical ﬁndings. For this reason we conduct an empirical analysis, where evidence for sorting
and selection is identiﬁed, and the model’s broader predictions are tested. In general, there is a
close ﬁt between the model’s predictions and the empirical evidence.
However, our model cannot predict the evolution of ﬁxed wages. This suggests that the job-
assignment model should be extended by other building blocks in a larger integrative model, as
suggested in Gibbons and Waldman [1999a,b]. In the following, we discuss the empirical ﬁndings
that an integrative model has to accommodate. Also, we explore possible theoretical explanations
and provide suggestions for future research.
Table 6 presents a set of Mincer wage equations. In contrast to the standard case, these
regressions include information on the ﬁrm’s hierarchy. Thus, the results obtained reﬂect within-
rank wage dynamics. Model 1 shows that the wage is increasing in the levels of education, tenure,
and rank. Model 2 explores the eﬀect of a bonus payment on current wages. The point-estimate
shows that a bonus payment last period (which also can be interpreted as high performance)
leads to signiﬁcantly higher current wages. An extension of this analysis is conducted in model
3, where information of up to three years of lagged bonus payments is included. The remarkable
result reveals that lagged bonus payments are highly signiﬁcant. Furthermore, they have similar
eﬀects on current wages. Hence it is not the timing, but instead the event of bonus that seems
to be important.
To investigate this issue further, model 4 estimates the eﬀect of the last two years’ bonus
payments on the wage, together with an interaction-eﬀect, capturing the consequences for current
wages of receiving bonuses in both years.30 The interaction-term in this regression is insigniﬁcant,
reﬂecting that bonuses are increasing wages every time they are observed. In other words, the
bonus-eﬀect is not deﬂated or magniﬁe dw h e nt h ee m p l o y e ei so b s e r v e dt oh a v eap e r s i s t e n t
high performance. These empirical observations are not easily explained by the job-assignment
model, but a variety of other theoretical explanations provide possible explanations. Here, on-the-
job human-capital acquisition, symmetric learning, and asymmetric learning with probabilistic
outside oﬀers are discussed.
The ﬁrst potential explanation for the ﬁxed-wage dynamics is on-the-job human-capital ac-
quisition. Gibbons and Waldman [1999a,b] show how on-the-job human-capital acquisition, in
conjunction with other building-block models (job assignment and learning) can be used to ex-
plain a large set of empirical evidence. The Gibbons and Waldman model distinguishes between
the employees’ innate ability, which can be high or low, and eﬀective ability, which is a function of
the employees’ innate ability and labor-market experience. An assumption on symmetric informa-
tion and steady changes in the employees’ eﬀective ability caused by continuous growth in labor-
market experience leads to ﬁxed-wage dynamics. Thus, on-the-job human-capital acquisition
30The focus on the last two years’ bonus payments is only for expositional reasons, and easily could be extended
to include all three years and their interaction terms.
22implies a simple, upward-sloping ﬁxed-wage scheme for all workers. On-the-job human-capital
acquisition, however, cannot explain, without a stretch, the signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient on
bonus payments, which we observe in our data.
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Demographic  variables  YES YES YES YES 
Job  category  YES YES YES YES 
Time  dummies  YES YES YES YES 
      
R-squared  0.865 0.878 0.890 0.885 
# observations  145,717  104,413  31,971  66,180 
Note: Standard errors are clustered with respect to individuals in models 1 to 4. The lagged variables included in the 
regressions determine the number of observations used in the estimation.
Table 6: Mincer wage equations
Second, symmetric learning, ﬁrst investigated by Farber and Gibbons [1996], oﬀers an al-
ternative explanation. Under symmetric learning, outside ﬁrms can be expected to condition
oﬀers on the very same signals as the currently employing ﬁrm. In the context of the theoretical
model, and given the empirical evidence provided in Table 6, the relevant quality signals are ed-
ucation, bonus payments, survival in the ﬁrm, and promotions. As potential outside employers
observe these signals, the employee’s alternative option
¡¯ U
¢
becomes a function of the employee’s
perceived type. Raising ¯ U, could, in principle, raise the ﬁxed wage in order to secure that the
23participation constraint continues to be satisﬁed.
The third explanation is based on asymmetric learning, with probabilistic outside oﬀers. If
outside ﬁrms cannot observe bonus payments within the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm still might want to increase
the ﬁxed wage for those employees who are more likely to be of high ability. Let us suppose, for
instance, that outside ﬁrms are uncertain, with respect to the worker’s quality, and give imprecise,
probabilistic oﬀers. Thus, sometimes, good employees leave the ﬁrm for alternative jobs. Yet, if
the ﬁrm learns about the type of the worker, it might increase the wages of those employees who
are likely to be of high ability. The reason to do this is that the ﬁrm can reduce the probability of
high-quality employees leaving the ﬁrm. Thus, probabilistic outside oﬀers can also lead to wage
increases in perceived type, as predicted above. The advantage of the probabilistic outside-oﬀer
explanation is that it does not necessarily require that the current ﬁrm and outside ﬁrms have
the same information about employees.31
In sum, a variety of explanations are available to answer how signals create ﬁxed-wage dy-
namics. These theories imply that our job-assignment model can be extended to capture wage
dynamics. Yet, to step further, more research is needed on ﬁrm-level data in order to evaluate
the relative merits of the above theories. At this stage, we can only say that wage dynamics can
be made consistent with the model.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Firms are known to oﬀer highly complex incentive contracts to their employees. Such contracts
most often contain ﬁxed wages, bonus payments, promotions, and layoﬀs. In this paper, we aim
at understanding why ﬁrms prefer such an incentive mix. In order to do so, a theoretical model
is built, and subsequently it is tested on personnel data. The key result is that ﬁrms that are
concerned about the quality of the workforce have an interest in using the full incentive mix. In
particular, these ﬁrms use ﬁring, because it contributes to selection, besides its incentive role.
This ﬁnding is important for two reasons. First, it shows that regulating ﬁring has profound
implications for ﬁrm proﬁtability. The reason is that quality-concerned ﬁrms might want to ﬁre
badly performing employees, even when the level of employment is constant, to improve the
average quality of their workforce. Thus, labor-market regulations limiting ﬁring might well put
these quality concerned ﬁrms at a comparative disadvantage when competing on the international
market.
Second, this paper refocuses attention on ﬁring in personnel economics by illustrating that
ﬁring has profound and unexpected consequences. For instance, it is shown theoretically, that
positive selection on tenure within a given rank is a possibility. This ﬁnding, which is supported
by the data, challenges previous research in the area.
In addition, this paper shows that a hierarchy of incentives prevails. In particular, ﬁrms with
homogeneous employees, or without quality concern, would like to introduce incentives in the
following order: promotions, bonuses, and, ﬁnally, ﬁxed wages. Promotions are preferred over
bonuses, because they use free, residual incentives, such as managerial rent. This rent can be
exploited through promotions to elicit eﬀort from the lower ranks. Fixed-wages, absent ﬁring, do
31Asymmetric information could, in principle, lead to strategic rewards; that is, the current employer may give
bonuses and promote strategically. The reason is that bonuses and promotions are signals to the market about
the employee’s quality. Waldman [1985] argues that these concerns may lead to ineﬃciencies.
24not provide incentives, yet they might be necessary to secure employee participation, if bonuses
and promotions prove to be insuﬃcient. In contrast, when ﬁrms are concerned about the quality
and allocation of the workforce as is the case in the job-assignment model the hierarchy of incen-
t i v e si sm o d i ﬁed. The reason is that ﬁring together with promotions contribute to sorting and
selection of the employees hence ﬁring becomes essential for proﬁt maximization. Consequently,
bonuses will only be used to provide additional incentives besides the ones given by promotion
and ﬁring.
This paper also uses the optimal contract to derive predictions about the employee’s career
dynamics within the ﬁrm. These predictions describe the probability of receiving bonus payments,
promotion, and layoﬀ for the individual employee. In the empirical analysis, they are found to be
consistent with the empirical evidence. The success in testing a broad set of predictions, besides
the single prediction of the incentive mix allow us to state that the paper accommodates the
Gibbons and Waldman critique.
In conclusion, this paper casts a fresh new light on employee incentives by investigating
them in a joint empirical-theoretical framework. The results advance our understanding of the
incentive role of ﬁring in ﬁrms and its consequences for employee selection. Equally important,
the paper paves the way for future research. In particular, including other building blocks besides
job-assignment, it contributes to an improved understanding of observed ﬁrm behavior.
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8.1 Proofs
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and that the bonus (b) is canceling out of the equation. Then the ﬁrst-order condition, in terms
of the ﬁring parameter, can be written as:
−(1 − θ − δ)(UF + K) < 0.
Thus, ﬁring is minimized in equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma (2). Consider second period employee quality (µF) ﬁrst. Notice, that deter-
mining the volume of good quality employees determines employee quality as the ﬁrm employs
a unit volume of employees. Thus, the equilibrium proportion can be determined as the sum of
good employees newly hired into non-management and the number of good employees surviving
to the second period.
µF = µ
#o fn e w l yh i r e d
z }| {
[(1 − θB − µ(θG − θB) − δ)πF +( θB + µ(θG − θB)+δ)]
| {z }
# of goods newly hired
+µ − (1 − θG − δ)µπF − (θG + δ)µπP | {z }
# of goods surviving
Straightforward simpliﬁcation yields the result in (4).
Managers are promoted either internally or externally. The quality of managers can be
determined along a similar logic used above to determine employee quality. The number of
good promoted employees should be divided by the number of managers (1/H).T h en u m b e ro f
internally promoted managers is given by:
πPµ(θG + δ)
Next, note that externally hire managers have an average quality µ. The volume of external
hiring is given µ
1
H
− πP(µθG +( 1− µ)θB + δ)
¶





− πP(µθG +( 1− µ)θB + δ)
¶
Combining the terms yields the solution.
26Finally, to see that µF is increasing in the ﬁring rate, diﬀerentiate (4) with respect to πF.
P r o o fo fL e m m a( 3 ) . The proof of the lemma follows from the discussion preceding it. It is
straightforward to show parameter values where the incentive mix arises and is left to the reader.
Proof of Lemma (4). To see that selection on rank is positive, notice ﬁrst that in equilibrium,
the promotion constraint is binding, then:
µM =
µ(θG + δ)
θB + µ(θG − θB)+δ
≥ µ + µ(1 − µ)(θG − θB)(πF − πP)=µF
which expression can be simpliﬁed to
1 ≥ (πF − πP)(θB + µ(θG − θB)+δ)
where both terms on the right hand side are smaller than unity.
To see the statement on the selection on tenure, focus on the employees staying in employee
rank, after the ﬁrst period. The number of surviving employees is given by:
1 − (θB + µ(θG − θB)+δ)πP − (1 − θB − µ(θG − θB) − δ)πF
The number of surviving good ability employees is given by:
µ[1 − (θG + δ)πP − (1 − θG − δ)πF]
Thus, the quality composition of tenured employees can be written as:
µT = µ
1 − (θG + δ)πP − (1 − θG − δ)πF
1 − (θB + µ(θG − θB)+δ)πP − (1 − θB − µ(θG − θB) − δ)πF




1 − (θG + δ)πP − (1 − θG − δ)πF
1 − (θG + δ)πP − (1 − θG − δ)πF | {z }
A
+( 1− µ)(θG − θB)(πP − πF)
which is trivially higher than µ, if and only if πF >π P.
8.2 Managerial rent
The model assumes that managerial rent exists, yet it only handles it in a closed form. Here
we provide some reasons for this closed-form representation. There are two major explanations,
and both of them build on the same observation, namely that managers aﬀect the work of many
subordinates.
The ﬁrst approach justiﬁes rents by incentives. Calvo and Wellisz (1979) argue that rent is
an increasing function of hierarchical rank. Their model is based on costly supervision, where
shirking employees are punished by ﬁring. This punishment, however, is only eﬀective as long
as there are rents with respect to the job. As managers aﬀect the work of many subordinates,
they are given more rents to ensure no shirking. Thus, the ﬁrm might be tempted to oﬀer higher
compensation for managers, even if the nature of the work is not diﬀerent, and all the workers
27and managers are identical. In sum, a wage (and rent) ladder might prevail, even absent quality
diﬀerences.
The second rationale, suggested here, stems from the ﬁrm’s desire to curb managerial turnover
(more than the turnover of the non-management level). The intuition is simple, and again it
rests on the observation that managers aﬀect the output of many other employees. If a non-
management employee leaves, it disrupts his own output. If a manager leaves, the leave disrupts
the output of the manager and all his subordinates. Consequently, the ﬁrm would like to give
stronger incentives to stay for managers than for workers. If outside oﬀers are probabilistic, rents
can be used to induce loyalty. Thus, in this setting, the manager’s compensation will include
rents (and higher ones than that of the employees).
Finally, managerial rent has empirical support. It is generally understood that employees
prefer to be promoted with the ongoing conditions. Thus, managerial work is more desirable,
supporting the ﬁrst incentive explanation. Also, voluntary managerial turnover is lower than
voluntary employee turnover, which lends support to the second explanation. In our data set,
for instance, lower-level managers and vice-presidents have a 9.80-percent and a 15.35-percent
lower turnover, respectively, than do employees.
In conclusion, then, we are comfortable with the closed-form modeling of managerial rents.
The available empirical and theoretical evidence seems to support its existence.
8.3 Action-set conditioning
Conditioning the action set on output, as it was proposed in the model, is without the loss of
generality.
In the basic model, the assumed action setup is general. The fact that the action set was
constrained on output realizations does not change the equilibrium. It is straightforward to check
that the ﬁrm would promote only high-performance employees, and only ﬁre low-performance
ones. Similarly, the ﬁrm would not pay bonuses to low-performers, even if the action set would
allow for that.
Under employee heterogeneity, the ﬁrm still prefers to promote well-performing employees,
and to lay oﬀ individuals with low performance. The reason is twofold. First, promoting well-
performing employees and laying oﬀ badly performing ones is useful for incentive purposes.
Second, selection considerations also strengthen the promotion and layoﬀ policy. As managerial
output is relatively more important than non-managerial output, better-quality employees are
more desirable for promotion. Thus, the ﬁrm prefers to promote high-performance individuals,
as they are more likely to have high ability. Similarly, conditioning layoﬀso nl o wp e r f o r m a n c e
makes sure that the ﬁred individual is relatively more likely to be of low ability. This improves
the overall quality of the workforce, and hence has a positive impact on productivity. Again, it
is straightforward to see that bonuses are only paid to well-performing agents, just like in the
homogeneous case.
288.4 Additional regressions
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Demographic variables  YES  YES 
Time dummies  YES  YES 
    
Log likelihood  -1545.22 
# observations  97,925 
Note: Reference category is: “Stay within rank”. In the period studied individuals with a short theoretical 
education are not promoted. 
Table 7: Multinomial logit
   Logit model   Fixed-effects  model 
 
 No  restrictions 
on tenure 
Conditional on 
tenure > 1 
Conditional on 
tenure > 2 
 Conditional  on 
tenure > 1 
Conditional on 
tenure > 2 
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Demographic 
variables 
YES YES YES    YES  YES 
Job  category  YES YES YES    YES  YES 
Time  dummies  YES YES YES    YES  YES 
           
Log  likelihood  -5,964 -5,230 -4,763    -1,741  -1,561 
# observations  10,801  9,674  8,872    5,740  5,167 
Note: Standard errors are clustered with respect to individuals in the cross sectional models.
Table 8: Bonus regression
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